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Neuroethics and ELSI: Similarities and Differences 
Henry T. Greely* 
 
In the last four years “neuroethics” has become a term to 
describe the study of the ethical, legal, and social implications 
of new technologies from neuroscience.  That field is strongly 
influenced by its predecessor, “ELSI,” the ethical, legal, and 
social implications of genetics.  Both areas are the result of 
ongoing revolutions in scientific knowledge directly relevant to 
human life, both concern technologies that will have 
substantial effects on human societies, and both discuss 
possibilities that scare many people.  Yet there is reason to 
think that neuroethics will expand in directions and develop in 
ways that are often significantly different from ELSI. 
This article attempts to map some of the similarities and 
differences between these two fields.  It first briefly reviews the 
history of both endeavors.  It then describes ways in which the 
substantive questions explored by neuroethics are likely both to 
parallel and to diverge from those analyzed by ELSI.  It ends 
by discussing the path forward for neuroethics and how its 




ELSI has two connected meanings.1  It is a field of study 
                                                          
     ©     2006 Henry T. Greely. 
      *   Deane F. and Kate Edelman Johnson Professor of Law, Professor, by 
courtesy, of Genetics, Stanford University.  The author would like to thank his 
research assistant, Jason Tarricone. 
 1. For people of a certain age, it also calls to mind “Elsie the Contented 
Cow” from advertisements for Borden’s Dairy Products.  Elsie, introduced in 
1939, was named by Advertising Age as one of the ten top advertising icons of 
the twentieth century.  See AdAge.com, Top 10 Advertising Icons of the 
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but it is also a set of structures, including prominently two 
federal programs that have provided an unprecedented amount 
of funding for studying the ethical implications of a new 
technology. 
People have been worrying about the implications of 
genetic technologies for decades.  By the mid-1970s, scholars 
were publishing volumes of conference proceedings about 
genetics and the law;2 by the early 1980s, a presidential 
commission issued two different reports on the implications of 
genetic engineering and humans3 and on genetic testing.4  The 
term “ethical, legal, and social implications” (or “issues”) seems 
to have first appeared in print (or at least in the Nexis 
database) with respect to genetics in 1990;5 the acronym ELSI 
                                                          
Century, http://adage.com/century/ad_icons.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2006). 
 2. See, e.g., NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON GENETICS & THE LAW, GENETICS 
AND THE LAW (Aubrey Milunsky & George J. Annas eds., 1976); NATIONAL 
SYMPOSIUM ON GENETICS & THE LAW, GENETICS AND THE LAW II (Aubrey 
Milunsky & George J. Annas, eds., 1980) (proceedings of a national 
symposium on genetics and law held in May 1980); NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON 
GENETICS & THE LAW, GENETICS AND THE LAW III (Aubrey Milunsky & George 
J. Annas, eds., 1985) (proceedings of a national symposium on genetics and 
law held in May 1984). 
 3. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. 
& BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE: A REPORT ON THE 
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES OF GENETIC ENGINEERING WITH HUMAN BEINGS 
(1982). 
 4. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
MEDICINE & BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND 
COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, SOCIAL, 
AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC SCREENING, COUNSELING, AND 
EDUCATION PROGRAMS (1983). 
 5. See David Kramer, Paper Describes DOE/NIH Genome Project, but 
Avoids Money Question, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS (Platts, New 
York, N.Y.), May 14, 1990, at 6 (describing the first NIH-DOE five year plan 
for the Human Genome Project).  The second use was in the main stream 
media, when the New York Times referred to Dr. Nancy Wexler as the head of 
the working group on ethical, legal and social issues.  See Sandra Blakeslee, 
Ethicists See Omens of an Era of Genetic Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at 
B9.  Interestingly, the phrase does turn up earlier in Nexis in connection with 
the implications of other biomedical technologies.  A 1983 article in Science 
about in vitro fertilization refers to its “ethical, legal, and social consequences.”  
Clifford Grobstein et al., External Human Fertilization: An Evaluation of 
Policy, 222 SCIENCE 127, 129 (1983).  The phrase appeared in two newspaper 
articles from Australia, one about HIV policy, Events of Interest Tonight, 
ADVERTISER, Aug. 8, 1986 (“medical, ethical, legal and social implications”), 
and one that described a government committee, the National Bioethics 
Consultative Committee, then newly-appointed to study advances in medical 
technologies more generally.  Philip Heyward, New Group Seeks Consensus 
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followed in 1991.6  This “acronym as noun” caught on, at least 
in the most directly relevant areas of bioethics and genetics, 
seeing off an early challenge from “genethics.”7 
                                                          
Where Controversy Rages, HOBART MERCURY, May 18, 1988 (“ethical, legal, 
and social issues”).  I suspect its American usage stemmed more directly from 
the fairly broad coverage of the term in Canada in 1989 when the government, 
in the “Speech from the Throne” laying out its program for the year, called for 
creation of a royal commission to inquire into new reproductive technologies, 
citing “concern that these scientific advances will outpace our ability to deal 
with their moral, ethical, legal and social implications.”  Governor-General 
Jeanne Sauve, Speech from the Throne Touches on Wide Range of Issues,  
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 4, 1989, at A20.  In Canada the word “moral” stuck and 
for some years the Canadians talked about “MELSI.”  It is interesting to 
speculate why the NIH-DOE working group adopted everything except “moral” 
from the Canadian phrase.  I suspect it was to avoid religious connotations 
associated with “moral”: “ethical” seems more secular.  In any event, the 
Canadians seem to have replaced MELSI more recently with GELS, which 
stands for “genomics ethical, legal, and social issues” or, much worse, by 
GE3LS, for “genomics ethics, environmental, economic, legal, and social 
issues.”  Of course, the 1983 report on genetic testing by the President’s 
Commission almost used the term in its title, which referred to “ethical, social, 
and legal implications.”  ESLI, however, would not have been as euphonious 
an acronym as ELSI. 
 6. “Three percent of the total budget, or an estimated $ 90 million over 
15 years, will be used to study ‘ELSI’ — ethical, legal and social issues.” Judy 
Foreman, Working Out the Genome Project Ethics – In Advance, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 4, 1991, at 25. 
 7. “Genethics” first appears in the Nexis database in 1983, in quotations, 
as a term used by then-representative Al Gore: “In a statement . . . Gore said 
that the new genetic technologies created a complex set of ethical questions—
which he called ‘genethics.’”  Michael Schrage, Clergy Hit for Stance on Genes, 
WASH. POST June 23, 1983, at C10.  (The number of publications included in 
Nexis was quite small in the early 1980s and the database has very limited 
coverage before 1980; it cannot be relied upon to find the first use of a term 
from that era, but it is some evidence of the amount of its use.)  The term 
appears seven more times in the 1980s, six of them in references, usually in 
reviews, to a book with that word in its title: DAVID SUZUKI & PETER 
KNUDTSON, GENETHICS: THE CLASH BETWEEN THE NEW GENETICS AND 
HUMAN VALUES (1989).  One of the book reviews notes the creation at about 
that same time of a European coalition called the “Genethic Network,” which 
seems to have come and gone quickly.  See Liebe F. Cavalieri, Ethics in the 
Brave New World, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 1989 (Book World), at 9.  From 1990 
through 1994, genethics appeared fifteen times (six of them about a biotech 
company with that name) compared with twenty-six mentions for ELSI; by 
2000 through 2004, the numbers were 101 uses of genethics to 157 for ELSI.  
Most of the “genethics” uses referred to either an Australian “GenEthics 
network” or a “genethics competition” in Australian schools; several of them, 
though, were from various reprintings of a column by William Safire.  (The 
“ELSI” search was for “ELSI and genetics” as “ELSI” by itself picks up both a 
company whose stock exchange symbol was ELSI and a surprising number of 
women named Elsi.)  “Genethics” is a more transparent term, with a more 
obvious meaning, than ELSI.  I suspect it lost out in part because it was too 
similar to “genetics”; this both made the spoken term confusing and, perhaps 
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But “ELSI” as an activity can probably be dated to 
September 26, 1988, when it took its first step toward being not 
just an area of scholarly activity but a well-funded government 
program (or two).  That day, Dr. James Watson was introduced 
as the first director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
Office of Genome Research (which became the National Center 
for Human Genome Research (NCHGR) in 1990), a newly 
established unit of the NIH.8  The NIH was to share the work, 
and the funding, of deciphering the entire human genome with 
the Department of Energy (DOE), with NIH receiving roughly 
two-thirds and DOE roughly one-third of the funding.  (The 
NIH share eventually grew to about eighty percent.) Watson, 
however, was to have oversight of sorts over both parts of the 
Project.  He immediately made a commitment to what became 
ELSI: 
At the press conference to announce his appointment, Watson 
declared that the ethical and social implications of genome research 
warranted a special effort and should be funded directly by NIH. . . . 
Remaining in character, he made the public commitment before 
conferring with Wyngaarden [the Director of NIH] or anyone else at 
NIH.9 
Watson ultimately proclaimed that the Human Genome Project 
would devote three to five percent of its funding to studying the 
ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic technologies. 
It has never been clear to what extent Watson’s pledge was 
motivated by his political assessment that the Project would be 
more likely to be funded with that commitment and to what 
extent it came from his own belief that the ethical issues were 
genuinely important.  Watson has not said and, given his 
personality and history of frequent provocative comments, it is 
not clear how much credibility to accord whatever he might say 
about his motivations.  The view of Robert Cook-Deegan, the 
historian of the early years of the Human Genome Project and 
a participant in its building, is that “[i]f there was a protective 
motive for Watson’s support [of ELSI], there was also a long-
                                                          
more importantly, made it seem “too cute.”  “Neuroethics” is not nearly as 
close in sound to its scientific parent, “neuroscience.” 
 8. See Larry Thompson, Gene Pioneer Will Head Mapping Project, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 27, 1988 (Health), at 7. 
 9. ROBERT COOK-DEEGAN, THE GENE WARS: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND 
THE HUMAN GENOME 163 (1994).  Interestingly, as far as I can tell none of the 
immediate news reports of Watson’s appointment mentioned his financial 
commitment to ethics research. 
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standing interest.”10 
Whatever his reasons, his pledge got results.  In 1990 both 
the NCHGR and the DOE created programs on the ethical, 
legal, and social implications of genetics.11  The NIH 
established “the ELSI Branch” in its Division of Extramural 
Research and the DOE established its own ELSI Program in its 
Office of Energy Research.  The NIH program concentrated on 
funding external grants, mainly to academics for conferences, 
working groups, articles, and books.  More of the DOE funding 
was spent internally, largely at national laboratories that were 
part of the legacy of the Manhattan Project and the Atomic 
Energy Commission, including Los Alamos, Lawrence 
Livermore, Lawrence Berkeley, and Oak Ridge.  From 
September 1989 to 1997, the two efforts were loosely 
coordinated by the National Institutes of Health-Department of 
Energy Working Group on Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Implications of Human Genetics Research (ELSI Working 
Group).  The ELSI Working Group was abolished in 1997, but 
the separate NIH and DOE programs continued. 
Watson resigned as director of NCHGR in 1992 after a 
dispute with Bernadine Healy, then director of NIH, over NIH 
policies concerning gene patents.  He was succeeded in 1993 by 
Francis Collins, a pediatrician and geneticist who had helped 
lead the team that in 1989 isolated the gene responsible, when 
mutated, for cystic fibrosis.  Collins remains director of the 
organization, which in 1997 was promoted to the status of a full 
institute at the NIH, the National Institute for Human Genome 
Research.  Under Collins, the ELSI program has continued to 
be very active under several different NIH directors.  After 
Watson, the program has shown more interest in policy 
analysis and, recently, in creating Centers of Excellence in 
Ethics Research around the country.12  The DOE ELSI program 
                                                          
 10. Id. at 248. 
 11. This brief history is derived largely from three sources (as well as 
personal experience).  See National Human Genome Research Inst., The 
Planning and Evaluation History of the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications 
(ELSI) Research Program  [hereinafter ELSI History], 
http://www.genome.gov/10001754 (last visited Mar. 29, 2006); COOK-DEEGAN, 
supra note 9; Kathi E. Hanna, The Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications 
Programs of the National Center for Human Genome Research: A Missed 
Opportunity?, in COMMITTEE ON THE SOCIAL & ETHICAL IMPACTS OF 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOMEDICINE, INST. OF MED., SOCIETY’S CHOICES: SOCIAL 
AND ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN BIOMEDICINE 432 (Ruth Ellen Bulger et al. 
eds., 1995). 
 12. Glenn McGee has written an interesting analysis of the change in 
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also continues and has had remarkably stable leadership under 
Dr. Daniel Drell from June 1991 to the present.  The DOE 
ELSI program has limited its focus to education about genetics, 
the privacy of genetic information, and employment 
consequences of genetics. 
The Human Genome Projects at both NIH and DOE have 
consistently spent about three to five percent of their budgets 
on ELSI activities.  The two agencies boast that they are 
running the largest bioethics project in the world.  Over the 
last fifteen years, they have spent more than $150 million, 
leading to hundreds of articles, books, conferences, and other 
research and educational activities on the ethical, legal, and 
social implications of genetics.  Scholarship on these issues has 
proceeded in the United States without government funding, 
or, for some kinds of research—such as much legal research—
without any funding at all, but the ELSI programs have 
certainly meant that more such research has been done and 
more researchers have been lured into the field.  It is hard to 
know how to assess whether the financial investment in ELSI 
has been worthwhile; it is noteworthy, though, that since the 
American part of the Human Genome Project was created—
with active ELSI programs from the beginning—public 
controversies about human genetics have not seriously 
threatened the Project’s funding. 
The Human Genome Project, of course, was not solely an 
American endeavor.  It was pursued by researchers, and paid 
for by funds, from many countries, notably the United 
Kingdom, Japan, and France.  Some ELSI work was supported 
by other countries, either individually or through regional 
organizations like the European Union.  Canada, for example, 
has had an active program in “GE3LS” (Genomics Ethics, 
Environmental, Economic, Legal, and Social Issues), which has 
received substantial funding and has created a significant 
cadre of Canadian researchers expert in the area. 
Genetics researchers from around the world created a 
voluntary association called the Human Genome Organisation 
                                                          
ELSI as a result of the Centers of Excellence in Ethics Research, arguing that 
Collins has, in effect, created publicly-financed ELSI think tanks, to the 
detriment of ELSI researchers not associated with those centers.  Glenn 
McGee, “Nanoethics”: The ELSI of 21st Century Bioethics?, THE EDITORS BLOG 
OF THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS, Jan. 29, 2006,  
http://blog.bioethics.net/2006/01/nanoethics-elsi-of-21st-century.html. 
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(HUGO) in 1988 with the hope of using it to help coordinate the 
worldwide project.  HUGO never did play the substantial role it 
initially envisioned, as international coordination seems to 
have occurred mainly as a result of talks directly between the 
agencies of the nations providing most of the funding and the 
researchers they funded.  In 1992, HUGO created its own 
ethics group, initially called the Ethical, Legal, and Social 
Issues Committee, with very broad international membership.  
This HUGO committee, now called simply the HUGO Ethics 
Committee, has not funded research by others, as HUGO itself 
has been consistently financially strapped.  It has, however,  
issued a number of useful and widely discussed policy 
statements, particularly under the leadership of Canadian law 
professor Bartha Maria Knoppers from 1996 to 2004.13 
A few legal academics, such as George Annas and 
Alexander Capron, took part in some of the earliest discussions 
of ELSI issues.  Initially these issues were dealt with in law 
schools, if at all, in “law and science” courses or a rare 
specialized seminar.  Since the growth of ELSI, many more 
legal academics have become involved in research that involves 
genetics, and law schools are seeing more seminars or even 
courses on “law and genetics.”  At this point, probably more 
than fifty active American law professors have published at 
least once on ELSI-related issues.  Although this is a small 
fraction of the roughly 6,000 full-time American law professors, 
it is a significant number. 
B. NEUROETHICS 
The term “neuroethics” arguably was coined, and surely 
was popularized, by New York Times columnist (and 
wordsmith) William Safire.14  Safire chairs the board of the 
Dana Foundation, a private philanthropic organization with a 
special interest in mental health, neurological diseases, and 
neuroscience.  He seems to have first used in the term in print, 
albeit with a hyphen, in a July 2001 column about human 
embryonic stem cell research, saying, in passing, “Disclosure: 
                                                          
 13. See Hugo Genome Organisation Ethics Committee, Policy Statements, 
http://www.hugo-international.org/committee_ethics_info.htm (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2006) (giving an incomplete list of the policy statements). 
 14. Research by Paul Root Wolpe has shown that the term had been used 
on several occasions before Safire, but in specialized publications, with 
somewhat different meanings, and without any apparent notice being taken of 
it. 
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When not vituperating for a living, I head a foundation that 
supports research in brain science, neuro-immunology and 
immuno-imaging.  We’re exploring studies in neuro-ethics, 
surely a growing field.”15  He returned to the now-hyphenless 
term more centrally in May 2002, devoting half a column to 
“the world of worry about unbridled science called  ‘neuroethics’ 
[which] . . . deals with the benefits and dangers of treating and 
manipulating our minds.”16 
Personally, I find “neuroethics” less than ideal as a 
description for this field.  It focuses entirely on “ethics” and 
ignores the legal and social issues that may be quite important.  
On the other hand, the term is catchy.  Once applied, it has 
been impossible to dislodge—particularly as the broader 
alternatives, like “ethical, legal, and social issues in 
neuroscience” (ELSIN) or “neuroscience ethical, legal, and 
social implications” (NELSI), are hopelessly clunky by 
comparison. 
Similar to ELSI, neuroethics has a “pre-history,” a long 
period during which scholars and others worried about the 
possible implications of neuroscience—defined broadly—and 
society.  It is little remembered today, but Huxley’s novel Brave 
New World was more about psychological conditioning, sleep 
learning, and the effects of prenatal exposure to alcohol or 
oxygen on cognitive traits than it was about genetics.17  
Philosophers, in particular, have a long history of interest in 
the mind, some of which spilled into neuroscience, with 
particular interest in issues of free will and personal 
responsibility. 
In 1984, the late, lamented Office of Technology 
Assessment issued a thirty-six page background paper on the 
social implications of neuroscience,18 but the federal 
government did not follow it up.  On July 25, 1989, Congress 
passed House Joint Resolution 174, declaring the 1990s “the 
                                                          
 15. William Safire, Stem Cell Hard Sell, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 2001, at A17.  
(The same language showed up without the hyphen in the version of the 
column published a few days later. William Safire, Time To Move Ahead, 
Boldly, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 9, 2001, at A9.) 
 16. William Safire, The But-What-If Factor, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2002, at 
A25. 
 17. See ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD  (Harper & Row 1969) 
(1932). 
 18. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, IMPACTS OF 
NEUROSCIENCE—A BACKGROUND PAPER (1984). 
GREELY_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:34:17 PM 
2006] NEUROETHICS & ELSI 607 
Decade of the Brain,”19 followed by a presidential proclamation 
of the same in June 1990.20  Although this announcement came 
at the same time as the development of ELSI inside NIH and 
DOE, no neuroethics movement resulted, nor, it appears, was 
one even contemplated.  (Cook-Deegan does report, however, 
that other institutes of NIH watched the ELSI experiment at 
NCHGR very closely; it is possible that the National Institute 
for Mental Health (NIMH) or the National Institute for 
Neurological Disease and Stroke (NINDS) were among them.)21 
The world of neuroscience had shown some previous 
interest in ethical and social issues.  Since 1972, the Society for 
Neuroscience, one of the largest scientific societies in the world 
—its annual conference regularly draws around 30,000 
participants—has had a Committee on Social Issues 
(sometimes called the Committee on Social Responsibility).  
Since 1983, this committee has sponsored a Social Issues 
Roundtable at the annual convention, including both panel 
discussions and occasional plenary talks. 
To date, neuroscience has caught the attention of very few 
legal academics.  Before 2000, only four law review articles 
appear in Lexis with the words “neuroscience” or 
“neuroimaging” in their titles.22  Only two more have appeared 
since then.  The few legal academics interested in the brain (or 
the mind) were scattered into two very different fields—law 
and psychology and mental health law—which focused more on 
the rights of those facing possible commitment for mental 
illness.  The Association of American Law Schools (AALS) 
publishes an annual directory of law faculty in which those 
faculty can choose to list themselves as working in various 
specialties.  The number of faculty identifying themselves as 
working in Law and Psychology peaked at 128 in the 1995-1996 
                                                          
 19. See H.R.J. Res. 174, 101st Cong. (1989) (stating “the President of the 
United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling 
upon all public officials and the people of the United States to observe such 
decade with appropriate programs and activities”). 
 20. Proclamation No. 6158, 55 Fed. Reg. 29,553 (July 20, 1990). 
 21. COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 9, at 241. 
 22. One was a Note by my then-student, Dr. Jennifer Kulynych, which, 
when published in 1997, should have, but did not, spark my interest in the 
field.  Jennifer Kulynych, Note, Psychiatric Neuroimaging Evidence: A High-
Tech Crystal Ball?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1997). 
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academic year and is now down to roughly 116.23 
“Neuroscience” has never been listed as a specialty in the AALS 
directory and does not seem to have been the subject of any 
courses. 
In general, there has been surprisingly little discussion of 
the ethical, social, and legal issues raised by advances in 
neuroscience.24  What might be called, possibly with some 
hyperbole, the “modern era” in neuroethics almost certainly 
dates to 2002.  The key event was probably a conference held in 
San Francisco in May 2002, entitled “Neuroscience: Mapping 
the Field.”25  The conference was co-hosted by Stanford 
University and the University of California-San Francisco 
(UCSF) and was funded by the Dana Foundation.  The main 
organizers were Dr. Zach Hall, then Associate Chancellor at 
UCSF and now the President of the California Institute of 
Regenerative Medicine; Dr. Judy Illes of Stanford; and Dr. 
Barbara Koenig of Stanford, now at the Mayo Medical School.  
The conference brought together more than twenty speakers 
and an audience of over 150.  Its main themes were the 
implications of neuroscience for individuals, for social policy, 
and for clinical neuroscience, as well as issues associated with 
the dissemination of neuroscience discoveries.26  Its speakers 
                                                          
     23.  ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHS., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2005-
06 (2006);  ASSOCIATION OF AM. LAW SCHS., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 
1995-96 (1996). 
 24. One notable exception is a book written by a political scientist.  
ROBERT H. BLANK, BRAIN POLICY: HOW THE NEW NEUROSCIENCE WILL 
CHANGE OUR LIVES AND OUR POLITICS (1999).  This book contains chapters on 
a wide range of topics, including genetics and the brain, brain and behavior, 
intervening in the brain, brain grafting, and neurotoxicity.  It does not, 
however, discuss imaging technologies in any depth, and Blank, now at Brunel 
University in the United Kingdom, does not seem to have published more on 
these issues.  He has not been involved in more recent discussions of 
neuroethics. 
 25. Two other conferences in 2002 are worthy of note.  On February 7, 
2002, the University of Pennsylvania held a conference entitled “Ethics and 
the Cognitive Neuroscience Revolution.”  It was smaller than the San 
Francisco conference, less broad in its coverage of neuroethics, and it produced 
no written output, but an argument could be made for its priority.  In March 
2002, Michael Gazzaniga, a cognitive neuroscientist at Dartmouth who had 
recently been named a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics, hosted 
a fifteen-speaker workshop in London on “Neuroscience in 2025.”  This may 
not have had broad effects on the field, but it did mark my introduction to it, 
as Gazzaniga invited me to give the only talk at the workshop on ethical and 
legal issues. 
 26. My own contribution to the discussion included a much shorter and 
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included many, if not most, of those who have subsequently 
been viewed as working in neuroethics.  The Dana Press, 
operated by the Dana Foundation, produced a useful volume of 
proceedings of the conference, called Neuroethics: Mapping the 
Field. 27 
The period since 2002 has seen an increasing number of 
conferences, workshops, and publications dealing expressly 
with neuroethics.  One notable workshop was held jointly by 
the Dana Foundation and the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science in September 2003, entitled 
“Neuroscience and the Law.”  It brought together 
neuroscientists, law professors, judges, and practitioners and 
resulted in a book, again published by Dana Press, called 
Neuroscience and the Law: Brain, Mind, and the Scales of 
Justice.28  In 2005, the American Society for Bioethics and 
Humanities, the leading bioethics society in the United States, 
established a “neuroethics affinity group” and plans are under 
way for the formation of some kind of “neuroethics society.” 
And 2006 has seen the publication of Neuroethics: Defining the 
Issues in Theory, Practice and Policy, a book edited by Judy 
Illes with contributions from many of the researchers active in 
neuroethics.29 
Unlike ELSI, there has been little governmental support 
for neuroethics.  The main conferences were sponsored by 
private funding, especially from the Dana Foundation.  Thus 
far, neither NIMH nor NINDS, two major sources of federal 
funding on neuroscience, have shown any interest in a general 
neuroethics program.  The NIH has funded a few individual 
research projects, such as an RO1 project awarded to Illes.  
Other parts of the federal government have funded some efforts 
that have implications in the area.  The National Institute for 
Justice, in the Justice Department, funded Michael 
Gazzaniga’s 2002 workshop in London; the National Science 
Foundation and the Office of the Science and Technology 
Policy, pursuant to specific congressional authorization, have 
                                                          
simpler approach to the question of this article.  See Henry T. Greely, 
Neuroethics and ELSI: Some Comparisons and Considerations, in 
NEUROETHICS: MAPPING THE FIELD 83, 83-94 (Steven J. Markus ed., 2002) 
(outlining views on the likely legal, ethical, and social implications of 
neuroscience). 
 27. NEUROETHICS:  MAPPING THE FIELD (Steven J. Marcus ed., 2002). 
 28. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW (Brent Garland ed., 2004). 
 29. NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, AND 
POLICY (Judy Illes ed., 2005). 
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hosted a series of workshops on the use of neuroscience to 
improve lie detection, which have included some discussion of 
legal and ethical issues. 
II. ISSUES 
We now have over fifteen years of ELSI programs and a 
longer time of ELSI research.  New issues continue to emerge, 
as well as new interpretations of (and even evidence about) 
older issues, but the broad outlines of the field seem fairly 
clear.  Neuroethics is much newer, and its contents and borders 
are more obscure.  Nonetheless, it seems useful to look at the 
issues explored by ELSI and being examined by neuroethics to 
see where, and how, the newer field is likely to build on the 
older—and where it will not.  This section of the article starts 
with overviews of both fields and then analyzes first areas of 
similarity and then areas of divergence. 
Before starting, two major differences between these first 
need to be noted.  First, genetics studies characteristics that 
pass, strongly or weakly, from one generation to another.  
Neuroscience looks at characteristics of individuals (and their 
brains) that, except for any genetic roots they have, are no 
more likely to pass from one generation to another than any 
other trait that is influenced by environment, which, of course, 
includes the family as one key part.  Second, neuroscience is 
likely, in many cases, to be more powerful than genetics, 
especially for issues of behavior.  The genetic variations that a 
person is born with will sometimes influence his later behavior, 
but that influence will necessarily be mediated by years of both 
experience and chance.  The size, shape, health, architecture, 
and patterns of neuronal activity that exist at any given time in 
a person’s brain should be much more strongly connected to 
that person’s behavior.  They should, in fact, determine it.  
These two differences will explain much, though not all, of the 
differences in what issues ELSI and neuroethics examine—and 
how they approach them. 
A. OVERVIEWS OF THE FIELDS 
One can, of course, carve up the work in ELSI in many 
different ways.  All of it proceeds from the revolution in 
genetics sparked by our understanding of DNA and our 
consequent ability to “read” the genetic code.  The substantive 
research in genetics over the past thirty years has been 
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extraordinary and is, at least in its general outlines, well 
known.  I will not discuss the science, but will focus on the 
research and its implications.  I have found it useful to think 
about six major themes in the ethical, legal, and social 
implications of genetics: identity, uncovering the past, 
revealing the future, manipulation of genes and genomes, 
ownership and control, and effects on culture.30 
Identity issues include, prominently, the forensic uses of 
DNA but also the possible use of DNA for establishing “ethnic 
identity” and the controversy over human reproductive cloning, 
a form of assisted reproduction of particular interest only 
because of the almost complete genetic identity between the 
cloned and the clone.  Genetics can uncover the past in ways 
ranging from the history of the human species and its 
migrations, to the genetic conditions of historic figures, to the 
genealogies—or genetic parents—of individuals.  The most 
controversial area of human genetics is the use of DNA to 
predict the future: the future of living individuals with genetic 
variations linked to various diseases or traits, and the future of 
fetuses or even, through the process called preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis, embryos produced by in vitro fertilization.  
The proper uses of such predictive technologies, and the 
propriety of various users, such as insurers and employers or 
parents and governments, has occupied most of the attention of 
ELSI. 
Manipulation of genes or genomes, through somatic cell 
gene therapy, intentional inheritable genetic modification (also 
known as germ-line gene therapy), or inter-specific genetic 
chimeras (part-human or, more commonly, agricultural), has 
also been widely discussed.  Much ELSI research has focused 
on issues around patents—on gene segments, on genes, and on 
genetically modified organisms.  Other significant issues of 
ownership and control have included questions of personal 
property, as in the famous Moore case,31 privacy, and forced 
disclosure of genetic information.  Perhaps the most important, 
though not the most discussed, issues raised by the science of 
                                                          
 30. See Henry T. Greely, Ethical Issues in the “New” Genetics, in 7 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 
4762  (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 3d ed. 2001); Henry T. Greely, 
Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues in Human Genome Research, 27 ANN. REV. 
OF ANTHROPOLOGY 473, 475 (1998); Henry T. Greely, The Revolution in 
Human Genetics: Implications for Human Societies, 52 S.C. L. REV. 377 (2001). 
 31. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991). 
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genetics concern the broader effects of that science on human 
cultures.  On the one hand, this includes the effects on human 
societies if the science of human genetics produces its hoped-for 
payoff in reducing disease and extending life.  It encompasses 
our societies’ understandings of the relationships between 
humans that are embodied in our concept of “race,” as well as 
the family connections, clearly visible in DNA, with all of non-
human life.  Most profoundly, it speaks to the importance, 
great or small, of genetics in our lives—genetic determinism 
and, deeply still, genetic essentialism, the idea that, in some 
meaningful sense, we are our genomes (circling around, in a 
way, to the very first concern about identity). 
As it reaches its fourth birthday, neuroethics is a rapidly 
expanding area for research, as is the field of neuroscience on 
which it depends.  Neuroscience is in the early stages of a 
revolution, brought about by improvements in tools in several 
different areas.  As this explosion of our understanding of the 
human brain is not nearly as widely known as the revolution in 
genetics, I will discuss some of its key features. 
The most prominent changes have come from advances in 
neuroimaging.  Conventional x-rays were almost useless for 
imaging living brains, both because of the enclosure of the 
brain in the dense and x-ray opaque skull and the soft 
consistency of brain tissue.  Computerized axial tomography 
(CAT scans) allowed some imaging of the brain, but the real 
advances have come with a raft of other techniques, including 
positron emission tomography (PET scans), single photon 
emission tomography (SPECT scans), and, most notably, 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI).  All of these techniques can 
provide computer files packed with data about the structure of 
a brain, which can then be converted into visual 
representations of various brain cross-sections. 
PET and SPECT scans, along with a variation of MRI 
called functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), can show 
activity within the brain by tracing the location or 
concentration of various molecules, including glucose and de-
oxygenated hemoglobin.  These technologies allow living brains 
to be observed, both as their shape changes over time and as 
they function, by watching the location and timing of glucose 
and oxygen consumption.  These functional capabilities are 
allowing researchers to watch what areas of the brain are in 
greater or lesser use as test subjects use their brains—for 
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movement, for sensation, for emotion, or for thought.  This has 
led to published research on the sites, within the brain, of 
passionate love,32 the sense of mystical union with God,33 and 
the deepest level of Buddhist meditation,34 among many more 
mundane examples. 
Many other technologies are also contributing to the 
neuroscience revolution.  Electroencephalograms and other 
methods of measuring electrical flows within the brain are 
becoming more detailed and precise.  Transcranial magnetic 
stimulation is permitting an experimenter to make temporary 
changes in the function of chosen brain tissues, stimulating or 
repressing neuronal function.  Implanted microelectrodes and 
other devices are allowing the direct sensing and stimulation of 
small numbers of, or even individual, brain neurons.  New 
drugs are providing new ways to heal, or to enhance, human 
brains.  And, of course, the neuroscience revolution is in part 
the same as the genetics revolution.  Our improved knowledge 
of genes and their functions has included greatly increased 
knowledge of genes that are important to the brain and how the 
brain is affected by their normal and abnormal expression.  
Huntington’s disease, fragile X syndrome, Tay-Sachs and 
related diseases, and some cases of Alzheimer’s disease are the 
subjects of both genetics and neuroscience and so have become 
topics for both ELSI and neuroethics. 
Stemming from advances in neuroscience, neuroethics 
appears to be developing along three major lines.  One branch 
of neuroethics looks at ethical issues raised in the process of 
neuroscience research.  The work by Judy Illes and colleagues 
on the serious problem of unexpectedly incidental findings 
during neuroimaging is a good example of this strand.35  A 
                                                          
 32. Andreas Bartels & Semir Zeki, The Neural Basis of Romantic Love, 11 
NEUROREPORT 3829 (2000); H. Fisher, A. Aron & L.L. Brown, Romantic Love: 
An fMRI Study of a Neural Mechanism for Mate Choice, 493 J. COMP. 
NEUROLOGY 58 (2005). 
 33. Andrew Newberg et al., WHY GOD WON’T GO AWAY (2001) [hereinafter 
Newberg et al., WHY]; A. Newberg et al., Cerebral Blood Flow During 
Meditative Prayer: Preliminary Findings and Methodological Issues, 97 
PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 625 (2003) [hereinafter Newberg et al., 
Cerebral]. 
 34. Newberg et al., WHY, supra note 33; Newberg et al., Cerebral, supra 
note 33. 
 35. See Judy Illes et al., Ethical and Practical Considerations in 
Managing Incidental Findings in Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 50 
BRAIN & COGNITION 358 (2002) (discussing various ethical dilemmas arising 
from brain imaging); Judy Illes et al., Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging 
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second strand looks at the neuroscience of ethics—how human 
brains make ethical decisions.  There is substantial research in 
this area as well as the broader area of how human brains 
make decisions at all, which is sometimes called 
neuroeconomics.  Work by Oliver Goodenough and Kristin 
Prehn on neuroimaging during normative decisions is a good 
example of these kinds of research.36 
The third strand of neuroethics, which is likely to be the 
largest, looks at how existing or plausible discoveries and 
technologies in neuroscience are likely to affect societies, 
including their laws.  This comprises at least four areas.  The 
first is the consequences of improved prediction of mental 
illness, neurological disorders, or personality traits.  A second 
concerns the possibility of using neuroscience techniques to 
determine a person’s competence.  “Mind reading” is the third, 
which is plausible through the use of neuroimaging and similar 
technologies to associate detectable forms of brain activity with 
mental states, such as lying, bias, or the subjective experience 
of pain.  The final area is human brain “enhancement” through 
neuroscience technologies.  My own work has surveyed these 
issues and analyzed some of them.37 
                                                          
Research,  311 SCIENCE 783 (2004) (discussing ethical issues that have arisen 
incidentally from brain-imaging research); Brian S. Kim et al., Incidental 
Findings on Pediatric MR Images of the Brain, 23 AM. J.  NEURORADIOLOGY 
1674 (2002) (discussing incidental abnormalities found in brain MR imaging 
studies). 
 36. See Oliver R. Goodenough & Kristin Prehn, A Neuroscientific 
Approach to Normative Judgment in Law and Justice, 359 PHIL. 
TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 1709 (2004) (examining developments 
in neuroscience that provide insight into brain processes involved in 
normative judgment).  The entire November 2004 publication of the 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Series B, is devoted 
to “Law and the Brain,” with a focus on neuroimaging and normative 
decisionmaking. 
 37. See, e.g., Henry T. Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and 
Property: Some Possible Legal and Social Implications of Advances in 
Neuroscience, in NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 114 
[hereinafter Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property] (exploring 
the social and legal consequences that neuroscience could bring); Henry T. 
Greely, The Social Effects of Advances in Neuroscience: Legal Problems, Legal 
Perspectives, in NEUROETHICS: DEFINING THE ISSUES IN THEORY, PRACTICE, 
AND POLICY, supra note 29, at 245 [hereinafter Greely, The Social Effects] 
(examining how developments in neuroscience will affect law and the legal 
system); Henry T. Greely, Premarket Approval Regulation for Lie Detection: 
An Idea Whose Time May Be Coming, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 50 (2005) (discussing 
the development of technically assisted lie detection and its use inside the 
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Neuroscience will share some of the issues examined by 
ELSI research, allowing it to build on that work as appropriate. 
The area that seems most likely to be strongly similar is 
prediction; areas of lesser but still substantial overlap include 
manipulation, the privacy area of ownership and control, 
cultural impacts, research uses, and enhancement.  Other 
questions, however, such as those of identity, uncovering the 
past, patents, personal property, source of ethics, competence, 
and mind reading, exist largely in either ELSI or neuroethics, 
but not in both. 
B. PREDICTION: THE STRONGEST LINK BETWEEN NEUROETHICS 
AND ELSI 
The correspondence between neuroethics and ELSI is 
strongest in prediction.  Genetics can predict—sometimes 
powerfully, sometimes weakly—a person’s future health and 
other traits.  There has been great concern that insurers, 
employers, and others might use this information against 
people.  Neuroscience will similarly be able to predict the 
future diseases or traits of people, again strongly or weakly, 
with the potential for similar consequences.38  For living people, 
neuroscience predictions may well have a broader effect than 
genetic ones; for embryos or fetuses, however, genetic 
prediction will probably remain much more powerful. 
For living people, neuroscience has an advantage over 
genetics in that it can look at the present condition of the brain, 
which should allow it to make a greater number of strong 
predictions than genetics.  The genetic variations a person has 
(apart from mutations acquired during life, which are mainly 
important in cancers) are established when her zygote is 
formed by the meeting of egg and sperm.  Making strong 
predictions from the genetic variations inherited at that 
earliest moment leaves out all the consequences of time, 
chance, and experience.39  A thirty-year-old woman has had 
                                                          
courtroom as well as in other disciplines). 
 38. The two fields will sometimes cover exactly the same technologies.  
For example, genetic tests can already be used to predict Huntington’s disease, 
an uncommon, progressive, and deadly neurological disorder usually 
diagnosed in middle age, raising not only issues of discrimination but when, to 
whom, and how such tests should be offered.  As Huntington’s disease is a 
neurological disease, these ELSI issues are also neuroethics issues. 
 39. This refers to the traditional predictive uses of genetics, in which 
inherited genetic variations are correlated with various outcomes.  It turns 
out, however, that not only is the sequence of a gene important in how the 
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thirty years and nine months during which other factors may 
have affected her inherited genetic tendencies.  On the other 
hand, neuroimaging of the same woman can reveal the 
structure and function of the brain as it has been affected by 
those years; other tests may reveal real-time levels of various 
crucial molecules.  There is no opportunity for intervening 
causes; behavior will be a function of how that brain and its 
neurons work.  Her genetic inheritance will be one part of how 
her brain and neurons work and, in some cases, like 
Huntington’s disease, it will be a determinative part.  But in 
most neurological diseases, mental illnesses, or behavioral 
traits, genetics will play a smaller part.  The “penetrance” of 
the genetic variations—the percentage of people with a 
particular set of such variations (the “genotype”) who have the 
disease, illness, or trait (the “phenotype”)—will be fairly small.  
It seems likely that the “penetrance” of the structural, 
functional, or biochemical aspects of the brain that are used to 
make predictions can be much higher. 
For example, for a very small number of people, genetic 
tests can already predict a near certainty of future Alzheimer’s 
disease in either early-onset or late-onset forms.  Genetic tests 
can provide weak predictions of somewhat heightened risk 
(well under fifty percent) for about one-third of the 
population.40  On the other hand, neuroimaging of amyloid 
plaques or tau protein tangles of people in their sixties, or even 
their fifties, may well lead to successful prediction of which 
elderly people are going to be diagnosed with Alzheimer’s 
disease.41  Neuroimaging should actually be able to see the 
                                                          
body (and the brain) functions, but so is when and how a gene is used—when 
it is “expressed” through the production of proteins or RNA.  Some of those 
changes are themselves inherited, not through changes in the sequence of the 
DNA but through various modifications to it.  These modifications are called 
“epigenetics.”   Expression of genes, however, is also very often affected by 
subsequent events or signals.  If one considers this kind of “expression 
analysis” as genetics, it may have the same kind of temporal advantages for 
predictions as neuroscience.  (Currently, however, direct study of the 
expression of genes in the brain requires fresh samples of brain tissue, a 
distinct disadvantage  when studying live humans.) 
 40. See, e.g., L.M. McConnell, B.A. Koenig, H.T. Greely & T.A. Raffin, 
Genetic Testing and Alzheimer Disease: Has the Time Come? 4 NATURE MED. 
757, 758 (1998) (discussing the current inadequacy of genetic testing to 
accurately predict Alzheimer’s disease, noting that just over a quarter of 
Caucasian adults have the appropriate genetic make-up for mere diagnostic 
testing).  
 41. See, e.g., H. van Dyck, Neuroimaging in Alzheimer’s Disease: 
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progression of the disease from asymptomatic levels to deadly 
ones, thus extending all the problems of prediction to a much 
larger group of people. 
Genetic tests can predict some other, relatively rare, 
neurological conditions, but although genetic associations are 
believed to exist, researchers have not found genetic variations 
that allow strong predictions about common mental illnesses, 
such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder, various addictions, or depression.  Genetics may 
ultimately be able to make such predictions, but experience 
thus far makes it plausible that, at least for most people, these 
diseases will prove such complicated mixtures of environmental 
influences, variations in multiple genes, and luck that only 
weak predictions will be possible.  The ability of neuroimaging 
to see both the structures of the brain and the functioning of its 
parts holds out the possibility that it may be able to make 
strong predictions about who will develop these disabling 
illnesses.  Increased knowledge from non-imaging neuroscience 
technologies may also lead to useful predictions. 
An estimated twenty-two percent of adults suffer, in any 
given year, from mental health disorders, 42thus again 
potentially expanding the number of people against whom such 
predictions could be used.  The stigma that continues to follow 
mental illness makes the possibility of discrimination even 
stronger.  Of course, for mental illnesses as for neurological 
diseases, if the ability accurately to predict the disease brought 
with it an ability effectively to treat the disease, people would 
happily endure the risks of prediction.  If, however, 
neuroscience follows the same path as genetics, good 
predictions will exist long before any good treatments, which, 
in both areas, makes the balance of costs and benefits of such 
predictions—at least for the individual involved—ambiguous. 
But the predictive power of neuroscience may be even 
wider than neurological diseases or mental illness and may go 
far beyond what genetics can do.  Personality traits and 
cognitive abilities are, after all, a function of how the brain 
works.  Some of these may have some genetic associations, but 
those have proven so complex as to be unknown, at least except 
                                                          
Relevance for Treatment, 3 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY REP. 13 (2001); C. Wu et al., 
Amyloid Imaging: From Benchtop to Bedside, 70 CURRENT TOPICS IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL BIOLOGY 171 (2005). 
     42.   Mental Health InfoSource, Mental Health Information and Statistics, 
http://www.mhsource.com/resource/mh.html (last visited March 3, 2006). 
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in the most extreme cases.  Some forms of intelligence, for 
example, seem to have genetic associations, but genetics can 
predict only the pathologically low levels of intelligence that are 
called mental retardation—and only a small percentage even of 
that.  On the other hand, various mental skills or personal 
characteristics might be predicted, or revealed, by neuroscience 
testing.  Of course, in general if one wants to determine a 
person’s math skills, a math test is a better method than an 
fMRI.  Such predictions might be helpful in connection with 
educational or career counseling for children, although a 
prediction of skills may also end up as a burdensome limitation, 
particularly if it is imperfect. 
But such predictions could also be helpful in quite different 
cases of predicting future behavior, where the behavior either 
cannot be tested for directly or the subject of the test has 
reason to conceal it.  Consider predictions about a criminal’s 
future dangerousness or the likelihood that someone is, or will 
become, a sexual predator or a sociopath.  Although genetic 
associations have occasionally been put forward for such traits, 
most notoriously in the alleged (and false) propensity to 
violence of men with one X and two Y chromosomes,43 they 
have failed.  It is much more plausible that neuroscience 
predictions will be more accurate—or that they will be wrongly 
taken as more accurate.  The implications of those predictions, 
for the criminal justice system among other things, may prove 
much more substantial than those of genetic predictions.  But 
the effects may reach beyond the justice system.  Claims of 
                                                          
 43. For a discussion of the early studies, see P.A. Jacobs et al., Aggressive 
Behaviour, Mental Subnormality and the XYY Male, 208 NATURE 1351 (1965).  
For a discussion of how the study was discredited, see Deborah W. Denno, 
Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 615, 620-22 (Dec. 1988).  A more scientifically legitimate “violence 
gene” has subsequently been identified.  A defect that makes inoperative the 
gene called MAO-A has been shown to lead to men with below average 
intelligence and a history of violent behavior, sexual assault, and arson.  This 
mutation, however, has been found only in the Netherlands and there, only in 
one family.  Avashalom Caspi et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence 
in Maltreated Children, 297 SCIENCE 851 (2002) (reporting results of the 
study); Erik Stokstad, Violent Effects of Abuse Tied to Gene, 297 SCIENCE 752 
(2002) (commenting on the study).  It cannot “explain” violence.  Another gene, 
called SRY, is found in almost all people who commit violent crimes; people 
without that gene are highly unlikely to commit violent crimes.  This is the 
gene most directly involved in making those who carry it male.  Although 
maleness is strongly associated with violence, that particular genetic test does 
not seem very useful. 
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genetic connections to sexual preference, though highly 
publicized, have not been proven.  It seems plausible that 
neuroscience testing might be more successful than genetic 
tests in predicting the eventual sexual preferences of children, 
adolescents, or adults, although it is not clear whether they 
would be accurate as other, already existing, tests.44  One can 
imagine parents, or others, seeking that kind of information, 
perhaps to attempt interventions. 
Although neuroscience is likely to do a better job than 
genetics of predicting brain-related characteristics of living 
people, it probably will not be as important as genetics for 
predicting the characteristics of “future people”—fetuses and 
embryos.  Those kinds of predictions give rise to some of the 
most controversial issues in ELSI, including state-sponsored 
eugenics and parental choice about their children’s genetic 
traits.  Part of the reason for the weakness of neuroscience is 
the other side of its strength with living people; with a fetus or 
an embryo, there is little or no accumulation of the effects of 
environment and chance.  To the extent that brain-related 
traits are functions, at all, of post-birth events whose marks are 
visible to neuroscience but not to genetics, they cannot be 
predicted successfully before birth.  There is another, more 
fundamental reason, however.  The embryo and fetus lacks, at 
first, any structure of a brain; for much longer it lacks any 
discernible brain function.  To the extent neuroscience 
predictions rest on brain structure and function, they are 
impossible unless that structure or function can be detected. 
The weakness of prenatal neuroscience is relative, not 
absolute.  It is possible, for example, to get structural images of 
the brains of later term fetuses through MRI.  It is possible 
that those screening technologies could be used to pick up some 
gross abnormalities in the developing brain, from anencephaly 
(a fatal condition where a child is born without a cerebrum) to 
possibly some forms of mental retardation or cerebral palsy.  At 
this point it is not clear what conditions could be detected using 
fetal MRI or at what stage of development they could be seen.  
It is at least possible that neuroscience methods might 
                                                          
 44. The penile plethysmograph, for instance, is a crudely straightforward 
test that involves measuring a male subject’s physical arousal as he is 
presented with a variety of sexual images depicting men, women, and 
children.  Jason R. Odeshoo, Of Penology and Perversity: The Use of the Penile 
Plethysmograph on Convicted Child Sex Offenders, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. 
L. REV. 1, 9 (2004).  It is commonly used in sex offender treatment programs.  
Id. at 7-8. 
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ultimately lead parents to decide to abort some fetuses with 
serious structural brain problems. 
C. AREAS WITH LESSER BUT SUBSTANTIAL OVERLAP 
Neuroscience predictions seem likely to raise ethical issues 
quite similar, but not quite identical, to the concerns that stem 
from genetic predictions.  Other uses of neuroscience will raise 
issues somewhat less similar to those raised by genetics with 
respect to manipulation, privacy, cultural impacts, research 
ethics, and enhancement. 
1. Manipulation/Intervention 
Most of the discussion of genetic manipulation in humans 
has centered on so-called gene therapy,45 where properly 
functioning copies of genes are transferred in order to cure 
genetic diseases in living people, called somatic cell gene 
therapy, or to prevent genetic diseases in future generations, 
called germ line gene therapy or inheritable genetic 
modification.  (There has also been substantial controversy 
about moving genes from one non-human species to another 
non-human species for agricultural purposes; this seems 
unlikely to happen significantly in neuroscience, except in 
laboratory research where it should not be controversial.)  After 
some early concerns about the idea of modifying a person’s 
genome, the idea of somatic cell gene therapy to cure disease 
has not been controversial, although research ethics issues 
about how to carry out these investigations remain.  The idea of 
somatic cell gene therapy not for treating disease or disability 
but for enhancing abilities beyond normal, however, does 
remain controversial. 
Neuroscientific “manipulations,” perhaps better termed 
“direct interventions,” are likely to follow a similar path.  The 
idea of intervening directly in people’s brains, by electronic 
implants or other intrusive methods, will evoke discomfort, 
particularly to the extent, parallel to genetic essentialism, that 
                                                          
 45. The term “gene therapy” is not a good one as there have not yet been 
any clinically accepted therapies as a result of this technique of gene transfer.  
“Gene transfer research” would be a better term for it, but this article will use 
the more widely understood term “gene therapy.”  And, ironically, as the field 
of gene transfer research has developed, far more research has gone into using 
gene transfer to combat diseases that are not caused, substantially or at all, by 
inherited genes, such as cancer and AIDS. 
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the brain is perceived as a person’s “essence.”  This is parallel 
to the uneasiness prompted by other intrusive interventions in 
the brain, whether eventually dismissed as medically 
inappropriate, like prefrontal lobotomies,46 or remaining in 
some clinical use, like electro-convulsive therapy.  As long, 
however, as the neuroscientific interventions are for the 
purpose of curing or alleviating disease or injury, their 
intrusions will be uneasily accepted, as, indeed, we currently 
accept such implanted brain devices as cochlear implants for 
deafness and deep brain stimulation for the treatment of 
Parkinson’s disease.  Neuroscience interventions for 
enhancement, however, will be quite controversial and are 
discussed below. 
There seems to be no likely neuroscience equivalent to 
concerns over germ line gene therapy.  Such genetic 
intervention is controversial because it may be transmitted to 
future generations; neuroscience interventions do not have the 
same potential for passing down to the families of their 
recipients. 
On the other hand, the issue of human/non-human 
chimeras has already become more controversial in 
neuroscience than in genetics.  Transferring human genes into 
non-human organisms is the most important technique of the 
biotechnology industry: find a human gene for a therapeutic 
protein (insulin, erythropoietin, granulocyte-macrophage colony 
stimulating factor), move it into non-human cells (E. coli, yeast, 
Chinese hamster ovary cells), and let those cells pump out 
commercial quantities of the human protein.  That this creates 
cells that are, genetically, part human and part non-human, 
has not caused concern, or even attracted much notice.  Of 
course, moving a large number of human genes into a non-
human creature (particularly a near relative like one of the 
great apes) or moving genes from a non-human species into 
humans would be likely quite controversial. 
In neuroscience, when Irv Weissman, a Stanford 
researcher, proposed to transplant human brain stem cells into 
fetal mice, he sparked a substantial controversy.47  Senator 
                                                          
 46. It is worth remembering that the invention of the prefrontal lobotomy, 
now generally viewed as a tragic and barbaric mistake, led to the award of the 
Nobel Prize in Medicine and Physiology to Egas Moniz of Portugal in 1949. 
 47. See generally Henry T. Greely, Defining Chimeras . . . and Chimeric 
Concerns, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 17 (2003) (discussing the definition of “chimera” 
and how a better definition will enhance understanding of ethical issues of 
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Brownback introduced legislation to make such research a 
felony;48 President Bush, supporting that legislation in his 2006 
State of the Union address, called “creating human-animal 
hybrids” one of “the most egregious abuses of medical 
research”;49 and even the National Academy of Sciences panel 
on human embryonic stem cell research guidelines called on 
researchers to use special caution when transplanting human 
stem cells into the brains of non-human animals.50  The 
potential value of such human/non-human chimeras for 
research into human brain cells makes it likely that this debate 
will continue. 
2. Privacy 
Genetic information has sparked worries about privacy for 
two different reasons.  One is the concern about the negative 
ways genetic information might be used against the person 
tested.  The other is a less instrumental concern, a feeling of 
invasion of an especially personal, private, or important aspect 
of a person.  Privacy feels particularly important in the genetic 
context because genetic information is not generally obvious 
but is instead usually “hidden.”  (Of course, not all genetic 
information is hidden; a person’s sex is almost completely 
determined by genes, as are various superficial characteristics 
                                                          
cellular and genetic transplantation between animal species); Mark Greene et 
al., Moral Issues of Human–Non-Human Primate Neural Grafting, 309 
SCIENCE 385 (2005) (discussing controversial findings that resulted from 
implanting human brain cells into mice in the larger context of brain-cell 
implants between various animals); Phillip Karpowicz et al., Developing 
Human-Nonhuman Chimeras in Human Stem Cell Research: Ethical Issues 
and Boundaries, 15 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 107 (2005) (discussing 
transplantation of human brain cells into prenatal nonhumans and related 
ethical concerns); Jason Scott Robert & Françoise Baylis, Crossing Species 
Boundaries, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1 (2003) (exploring the moral boundaries 
involved in the emerging field of combining human and nonhuman animals at 
the genetic and cellular level); Henry T. Greely, Outline of Talk to NAS Panel 
on Human Embryonic Stem Cells, 7-13 (Oct. 13, 2004), available at 
http://dels.nas.edu/bls/stemcells/Greelyoutline.pdf (discussing Weissman 
proposed experiments).  
 48. See Human Chimera Prohibition Act of 2005, S. 659, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 49. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 31, 2006), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/01/20060131-
10.html. 
 50. See COMMITTEE ON GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELL 
RESEARCH, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC 
STEM CELL RESEARCH 50, 55 (2005). 
GREELY_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:34:17 PM 
2006] NEUROETHICS & ELSI 623 
like skin color, eye color, and hair color.)  Information about an 
individual derived from neuroscience seems likely to be at least 
as sensitive.  It is equally susceptible to use against the person 
tested; it is at least equally personal, private, and important; 
and equally hidden—or hideable.  And both genetic and 
neuroscience information will have substantial legitimate uses 
that will make protecting the information all the more difficult. 
3. Cultural Effects 
The likely cultural impacts of genetics include its 
consequences for health, for our views of race, for our 
relationship with non-human life, and for genetic determinism 
or essentialism.  Neuroscience certainly may have effects on 
society similar to those of genetics through changes in human 
disease and age of death, although the details may differ.  The 
long-term social consequences of, for example, a substantial 
extension of the age of high mental functioning, could be 
extensive.  Like genetics, neuroscience might also affect our 
views of race.  Neuroscience seems likely to provide yet more 
proof of the irrelevance of “race” to mental ability, although, at 
the same time, one would have to be alert to possible racist 
misuse of any small variations that might be found. 
It is less clear whether or not neuroscience will raise 
cultural issues similar to those of genetics on other points. 
Genetics establishes common links—common genes and DNA 
sequences—between humans and other living things.  It might 
(or might not) cause us to accord more respect to other living 
things.  It remains to be seen what neuroscience tells us about 
the mental lives of other species and what conclusions we will 
draw from its findings.  The most common forms of life on 
earth—microbes—obviously will not share our mental world, 
nor will fungi, plants, or most small or simple animals.  But, as 
we come to understand the brain activities that mean planning, 
pleasure, or pain in humans, will we or will we not find similar 
activity in the brains of octopi or whales, of dogs or cats, of 
monkeys or chimpanzees?  And how would either answer affect 
our relationship to those species? 
The last area of possible deep cultural significance from 
genetics involves the relationship between individuals and 
their genomes.  One version of this relationship has been called 
“genetic determinism,” the idea that our genes determine our 
lives.  As Time magazine once quoted James Watson, “We used 
to think our fate was in the stars.  Now we know in large 
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measure, our fate is in our genes.”51  For almost all of us, 
Watson was wrong.  Unless we are unusually unlucky and are 
born with completely penetrant, untreatable, and serious 
genetic disease, genes are only one component—sometimes 
large, often small—in our fates.  Much ELSI discussion has 
focused on the falsity of genetic determinism and the dangers 
an exaggerated view of genes’ power could pose.  It is possible 
that a neuroscience determinism, accurate or inaccurate, could 
arise.  On the other hand, although our genomes are fixed 
ninth months before our birth, we know that our brains change, 
and are changeable, throughout our lives.  The complex and 
plastic nature of our brains makes them a less plausible, 
though still not impossible, source of determinism than our 
genes. 
“Genetic essentialism” is somewhat different from genetic 
determinism.  Genetic essentialism asserts that our individual 
genomes are, in some important sense, our true, essential 
selves.  The ELSI literature contains some discussion of genetic 
essentialism, but it has never seemed a serious threat.  Such a 
view would mean that identical twins, who share the same 
genome, were, essentially, the same person, something anyone 
who has known identical twins is likely to reject.  It also rejects 
any role for experience or chance in the making of our 
individual essence, which is also unlikely to be accepted, as 
everyone will have lived through experiences that seemed to be 
fundamentally important to his or her nature.  Genetic 
essentialism, in any non-trivial sense, is just not plausible. 
Neuroessentialism, however, seems much more plausible.  
If we could successfully transplant my brain into your body, 
would the resulting person be me with a new body or you with 
a new brain?  I believe almost all of us would say it was me 
with a new body—that the “essence” of the person is the brain, 
not the body.  My views on this may be influenced by many 
decades spent in settings—as a student, an attorney, and a 
professor—where the brain was particularly valued, yet I 
suspect the same reaction would be very widespread, if not 
universal.  Neuroethics may well have to deal with a 
widespread public acceptance of neuroessentialism, where 
ELSI never had to deal with a broad belief in genetic 
essentialism.  It is not at all clear whether that will raise 
                                                          
 51. Leon Jaroff, The Gene Hunt, TIME, Mar. 20, 1989, at 62, 67. 
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ethical, legal, or social problems. 
4. Research Ethics 
ELSI has engaged, and neuroethics will engage, issues of 
research ethics, but with different emphases.  ELSI has been 
concerned with many different questions of research ethics, but 
three areas have received particular attention.  One group of 
issues has revolved around the creation of large DNA 
repositories.  These repositories have provoked concerns about 
the consent necessary when people are giving permission to use 
their genetic material (and their personal health information) 
for an indefinite amount of future research on undetermined 
(and perhaps undreamt of) issues and about the confidentiality 
of that material and information.  A second set of problems 
deals with research on human populations and what kinds of 
consent or consultation may be appropriate from the group as a 
whole, as opposed to individual members of the group 
participating in research.  A third set of research questions, 
related to those of ownership, deals with whether research 
subjects are fairly treated if they receive no financial benefits 
while researchers create valuable products from their DNA and 
health information. 
These have some possible analogues in neuroethics.  Some 
databases of MRI and fMRI data are being created for general 
use of researchers, raising issues of consent by the research 
participants and the confidentiality of their information.  These 
databases are not very advanced in neuroscience and, as far as 
I know, there is not (yet) much individual health or other 
personal information associated with them, but this could 
become a concern. 
The issues around population research seem less related to 
neuroethics but not irrelevant.  Geneticists often look at 
particular ethnic or cultural groups in medical research 
because some groups will have a much greater burden of a 
particular genetic disease.  Populations, like families, are more 
likely to share some genetic variations with each other than 
with outsiders.  Finding genetic variations linked to the disease 
is easier in populations (or families) in which the disease is 
common.  This could also lead, however, to harms to the entire 
group through stigmatization and discrimination.  Neurological 
diseases, mental illnesses, or personality traits seem much less 
likely to be usefully studied in particular ethnic groups as there 
seems no a priori reason to think that any causes of such 
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phenotypes (other than genetic causes) are likely to be 
concentrated within the group.  Still, the risks that 
neuroscience research might harm a population (ethnic or 
otherwise) cannot be dismissed.  Some group-based research 
might occur, seeking environmental or other causes if a brain-
related phenotype were particularly common in a group, which 
could potentially lead to harm.  Perhaps more plausibly, more 
general research on brain-related traits could cause harm; 
consider, for example, the possibility of an exaggerated public 
reaction to a study that said that based on neuroimaging, 
“female brains” are not as good as “male brains” at 
mathematics. 
It is unclear how strong the issues of financial fairness 
may be in neuroethics.  As discussed below, it seems unlikely 
that patents on brain structures will be significant, unlike 
patents on genes.  Although we hope neuroscience will lead to 
successful treatments, and successful treatments are likely to 
mean profitable products, without  the sense (accurate or not) 
that part of a discrete individual’s body—his genes—have been 
used to make that profitable product, the ethical concerns may 
not be as great. 
This uneven relationship runs the other way as well.  The 
biggest research ethics issue in neuroethics has been incidental 
findings.  When researchers perform MRIs for research, they 
typically look for effects across the entire brain.  It is 
disconcertingly common to see unexpected odd things in the 
brains of research subjects, even young and healthy subjects.  
Some studies report finding abnormalities of uncertain 
importance in the brains of as many as forty percent of 
research subjects.  Most of the time those incidental findings 
have no apparent medical significance, or at least none known 
to the researchers.  What to do about those findings, both in 
investigating them and in telling the subjects about them, is 
unclear. 
The issue of returning information about medical risks has 
been occasionally raised in ELSI, but it has not taken a central 
position.52  Traditional genetics research has focused on a few 
“target” genes.  The ability did not exist to look at a vast 
number of the subject’s genes for abnormalities, so any findings 
                                                          
 52. See Henry T. Greely, Human Genomics Research: New Challenges for 
Research Ethics, 44 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 221, 225-26 (2001). 
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of abnormalities were not “incidental” but were part of the 
planned research—and presumably issues of follow-up and 
disclosure were anticipated.  As microarrays, cheap sequencing, 
and other new technologies make it possible to look at 
hundreds of thousands of genetic variations at once, genetics 
research is having to confront these same issues of incidental 
findings.53  Here neuroethics may help inform ELSI. 
5. Enhancement 
Questions of human biological enhancement arise in both 
genetics and in neuroscience, but in significantly different 
ways.  Enhancement issues are deeply interesting, whether in 
genetics, neuroscience, athletic-performing enhancing drugs, or 
cosmetic surgery.54 
In genetics, issues of enhancement arise from one of two 
mechanisms: prenatal selection or gene transfer (either somatic 
or, more commonly, germ line).55  The first method is limited to 
selecting among possible children based on their genetic 
variations and the traits associated with them, through fetal 
testing, abortion, or, for parents using in vitro fertilization 
methods, preimplantation genetic diagnosis and selective 
                                                          
 53. Within the past year I have been a member of one working group 
convened at Stanford to make recommendations on incidental findings in 
genetics research and have spoken to a second working group, at the 
University of Minnesota, on the same topic. 
 54. I have analyzed some of these issues in detail recently.  See, e.g., 
Henry T. Greely, Disabilities, Enhancements, and the Meanings of Sports, 15 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 99 (2004); Henry T. Greely, Regulating Human 
Biological Enhancements: Questionable Justifications and International 
Complications, U. TECH. SYDNEY L. REV./SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. (joint issue) 
(forthcoming 2006).  Other useful discussions include: ALLEN BUCHANAN ET 
AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE (2000); CARL ELLIOTT, 
BETTER THAN WELL: AMERICAN MEDICINE MEETS THE AMERICAN DREAM 
(2003); MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND 
THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY (2003); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, 
BEYOND THERAPY: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (2003); 
SHEILA M. ROTHMAN & DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE PURSUIT OF PERFECTION:  
THE PROMISE AND PERILS OF MEDICAL ENHANCEMENT (2003); Francis M. 
Kamm, Is There a Problem with Enhancement?, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 5 (2005); 
and Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,  
Apr. 2004, at 51 
 55. One might also view as “genetic” the use of drugs produced through 
genetic engineering or genetic knowledge, such as the use of Epogen (a 
biotechnology-produced version of the natural protein erythropoieten) for 
boosting an athlete’s red blood cell count.  The source of the drug in genetic 
technologies, however, does not seem to distinguish it substantially from drugs 
produced in other ways, such as anabolic steroids. 
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implantation.  These methods raise important ethical and 
constitutional issues of parental control over reproduction.56  
The second method can be used in living people (as well as in 
fetuses, embryos, eggs, or sperm) for either somatic cell gene 
therapy or germ line gene therapy, but has the disadvantage 
that it has not been shown to be possible, let alone safe and 
effective. 
The first approach and the germ line version of the second 
approach will have implications for future generations.  And all 
of the genetic approaches are only as powerful as the strength 
of the connections between particular genetic variations and 
desired traits.  Except for a few, usually uncommon, diseases, 
those connections are currently weak or nonexistent; although 
reasonably strong connections to cosmetic traits (such as hair 
color, eye color, skin color, and nose shape) seem likely to come 
soon, it is not clear when or if we will ever have strong 
connections to other, more important traits.57 
Neuroscience enhancement is likely to involve both 
pharmacological enhancements (“steroids for the brain”) and 
various kinds of implanted interfaces between the brain and 
electronic devices (“neuroelectronic interfaces”).  Some of these 
already exist.  Caffeine, alcohol, Prozac®, Ritalin®, Provigil®, 
and other drugs—some traditional and others approved by the 
FDA—are among many of the legal compounds that are 
sometimes taken to affect brain function, not just by the ill, but 
by normal, healthy people.  Cochlear implants use electronic 
signals to stimulate the auditory nerve so that some of the deaf 
can hear; technologies under development pick up signals from 
a quadriplegic person’s brain and use them to allow that 
disabled person to operate a computer.  These may well expand 
in the near future to be useful to healthy people.58 
Neuroscience enhancement issues do not implicate 
decisions about childbearing, but some of their hardest 
questions may involve questions of government control over 
                                                          
 56. See John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 
AM. J. L. & MED. 439 (2003). 
 57. See Henry T. Greely, Seeking More Goodly Creatures, 6 CEREBRUM 49, 
51-53 (2004); Henry T. Greely, Human Genetic Enhancement:  A Lawyer’s 
View, 17 MED. HUMANITIES REV. 42 (2003) (reviewing  MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, 
WONDERGENES: GENETIC ENHANCEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIETY 
(2003)). 
 58. See Greely, The Social Effects, supra note 37, at  255-56. 
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parental decisions about childrearing, whether in the 
government’s power to prevent parents from using 
neuroenhancement techniques on their children or in the 
parents’ power to refuse neuroenhancement methods 
demanded by the government.  Neuroscience enhancement will 
not pass in any direct biological way from one generation to the 
next, thus avoiding any issues of a biological “caste” system 
(what Mehlman referred to as a “genobility”).59 
On the other hand, it seems likely that neuroscience 
enhancements will be more common and more powerful than 
genetic ones.  The link between the present functioning of the 
brain and characteristics, primarily behaviors, that we will 
view as enhancements will be much more direct than links 
between genetic variations and behavior.  And, to the extent 
neuroscience enhancement takes the form of healthy people 
using (legally or illegally) pharmaceuticals that were developed 
for, and are widely marketed to, sick or disabled people—such 
as possible memory-enhancing pills prescribed for dementia—
controlling those technologies will prove very difficult.  And, of 
course, neuroscience enhancements will, by definition, involve 
the brain, which, as the discussion above of neuroessentialism 
indicated, may in fact be of unique importance to our sense of 
our own personhood and of our species’ humanity. 
D. DIVERGENT ISSUES 
Many issues of concern to ELSI do not seem likely to be 
significant questions for neuroethics.  These include questions 
of identity, revealing the past, patents, and personal property.  
At the same time, many neuroethics issues, such as the 
neuroscientific basis (if any) for ethics, questions of 
competence, and the problems of mind reading, have little or no 
parallel in ELSI. 
Genetics raises important questions of identity, not only 
through the forensic use of DNA to identify the source of 
human cells and tissues, from crime scenes, disasters, and 
elsewhere, but also, at least in some approaches, ethnic 
identity.60  Also, human reproductive cloning attracts special 
                                                          
 59. Cf. MEHLMAN, supra note 54, at 108-20. 
 60. See Henry T. Greely, Genetic Genealogy:  Genetics Meets the 
Marketplace, in REVISITING RACE IN A GENOMIC AGE (Barbara Koenig & 
Sandra Lee eds., forthcoming 2006); Kimberly TallBear, Native-American-
DNA.com: In Search of Native American Race and Tribe, in REVISITING RACE 
IN A GENOMIC AGE, supra. 
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interest among various forms of assisted reproduction only 
because of the genetic identity between the cloned baby and the 
DNA donor.  Neuroscience seems to have nothing to add in 
those areas. 
Genetics can also use DNA to reveal the past—the past of 
famous individuals, like Thomas Jefferson or Abraham 
Lincoln;61 the pasts (and futures) of many living people through 
paternity determinations; the pasts of ethnic groups;62 or the 
past of humanity as a whole.63  Neuroscience can do none of 
that.  At its most speculative, neuroscience might help clarify 
the history as perceived by living people by assessing the 
accuracy or authenticity of memories, but it is not clear that 
such a method is even conceivable. 
Patents arising from genetic technologies, whether patents 
on genes, on living organisms, or on human biological 
materials, have been a major source of ethical, legal, and 
political debate.64  It seems unlikely that anything similar to 
patents on the composition of matter that is a gene will come 
out of neuroscience.65  Some neuroscientists may end up 
patenting the use of certain patterns of brain activity in 
screening or diagnosis, but those kinds of patents, although 
causing some concern, have been less controversial in genetics 
and are likely to have similar consequences in neuroscience. 
The ownership of the actual physical “things” that make up 
genetic samples or other human biological materials has 
remained controversial and surprisingly unsettled.  The Moore 
decision66 is only law in California and a few states that have 
                                                          
 61. See, e.g., David M. Abbey, The Thomas Jefferson Paternity Case, 397 
NATURE 32 (1999); Eugene Foster et al., Jefferson Fathered Slave’s Last Child, 
396 NATURE 27 (1998); Eric S. Lander & Joseph J. Ellis, Founding Father, 396 
NATURE 13 (1998); Victor A. McKusick, Advisory Statement by the Panel on 
DNA Testing of Abraham Lincoln's Tissue, 7 CADUCEUS 43 (1991). 
 62. The story of the Lemba, a southern African tribe that apparently has 
substantial Jewish ancestry, is one fascinating example.  See Nicholas Wade, 
DNA Backs a Tribe's Tradition of Early Descent from the Jews, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 9, 1999, at A1. 
 63. See LUIGI LUCA CAVALLI-SFORZA & FRANCESCO CAVALLI-SFORZA, THE 
GREAT HUMAN DIASPORAS: THE HISTORY OF DIVERSITY AND EVOLUTION 
(Sarah Thorne trans., Addison-Wesley Publ’g Co. 1995) (1993). 
 64. For a good summary of the issues, see THE NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON 
BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA: A DISCUSSION PAPER (2002). 
 65. See Greely, Prediction, Litigation, Privacy, and Property, supra note 
37, at 114. 
 66. Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 
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expressly followed it, and even that decision can be read 
narrowly.  Although there may still be tough questions of the 
relative rights of researchers and research subjects to 
ownership and control over “things” produced in research, 
neuroscience seems unlikely to raise issues of personal 
property.  The relevant research materials in neurosciences 
will be information, produced by neuroimaging and other 
technologies, but will not often be physical pieces of brains (or 
cerebrospinal fluid). 
Moving to neuroethics issues, research into the basis in the 
brain for human ethics has an equivalent, but not in ELSI.  The 
overlapping fields of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology, and 
behavior biology look for, among other things, genetic or 
evolutionary explanations for human ethical judgments.67  
ELSI researchers have largely ignored these fields, probably 
because discoverable links between genetic variations and the 
broad and often amorphous behavioral characteristics that 
constitute human ethical and moral responses seem somewhere 
between distant and highly improbable. 
Neuroscience is likely to play a substantial role in our 
understanding of, and assignment of, competence or, more 
broadly, free will.  Although it seems unlikely that 
neuroscience will so completely overturn our views of human 
free will as to change the criminal justice system (and our 
ethics) fundamentally,68 it may certainly provide a better 
understanding of what it means to be competent as well as 
what is useful evidence in specific cases.  Although there have 
been some ill-fated efforts to use genetic defenses to criminal 
responsibility, the connection between inherited genes and 
current competence does not seem very useful.  People with 
very strong genetic evidence of lack of competence—people with 
severe mental retardation from a genetic cause—will not need 
to add genetic evidence to their overpowering behavioral 
evidence.  Weaker connections between genes and, for example, 
                                                          
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991). 
 67. See, e.g., EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS 
(1975); THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE 
GENERATION OF CULTURE (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992); Owen D. Jones  
& Timothy S. Goldsmith, Law and Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 
405 (2005).  But see DAVID J. BULLER, ADAPTING MINDS: EVOLUTIONARY 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE PERSISTENT QUEST FOR HUMAN NATURE (2005) 
(providing a detailed critique of Evolutionary Psychology). 
 68. See Stephen J. Morse, New Neuroscience, Old Problems, in 
NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW, supra note 28, at 157, 158-81. 
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violent behavior seem unlikely to be sufficiently strong as to be 
convincing.  A nice example of the difference might be the 
difference between a genetic test showing that a particular 
person is predisposed to develop the disease and an MRI 
showing, in that person’s brain, the accumulation of the 
amyloid plaques, tau tangles, and neuronal death that defines 
the disease. 
Finally, some of the most far-reaching ethical, legal, and 
social implications of neuroscience arise from the possibility 
that it may help us “read minds.”  By neuroscientific 
determination of patterns of neuronal activity, we may be able 
to know, or at least make a powerful guess about, what a 
person is perceiving, what emotions that person is feeling, 
whether she is lying or telling the truth, or even what she is 
thinking.  Genetics might, at most, be able to tell us whether a 
person has a predisposition to be happy or sad, or has strong or 
weak sensory organs, but it cannot say anything about an 
actual state of mind. 
III. ELSI AND NEUROETHICS ALONG THE PATH AHEAD 
ELSI is both a set of intellectual issues to be explored and 
a federally-financed program (or two) with substantial funding.  
Neuroethics is highly unlikely to be the subject of a similar 
program, but it will be—and already has been—a beneficiary of 
the ELSI programs.  And nascent programs in “nanoethics” 
provide another useful comparison. 
In the United States, the government-funded ELSI 
programs were the product of three factors: a major scientific 
initiative funded by federal agencies, the ready availability of 
money to spend on ethics, and a need for political cover on the 
issues involved.69  The Human Genome Project was the “big 
science” project of its generation, an expensive, high profile, 
and long-term research enterprise.  With funding projected at 
$3 billion over fifteen years, the idea of spending a few percent 
on ethics was easy to swallow, particularly as budgets for the 
Project were generous throughout the late 1990s and 
technology lowered the costs of doing the research.  And, as 
Cook-Deegan’s history of the creation of the Project so clearly 
                                                          
 69. I suspect the same factors were involved in ELSI programs set up by 
other countries, but I know too little about those programs, and the history of 
the Human Genome Project in those countries, to speak to them. 
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points out, public concern about genetics, reflected in Congress, 
made it crucial that the Project sponsors address, or appear to 
address, the ethical issues.70 
Neuroethics lacks all three factors.  There is no Human 
Brain Project.  The Decade of the Brain came and went without 
a correlative “big science” project, and it is difficult to see 
something like the Human Genome Project developing in 
neuroscience.  Part of the appeal of the Human Genome Project 
was that it had concrete goals—first mapping, then sequencing 
the “entire” human genome.71  The National Human Genome 
Research Institute is able to argue to extend those goals to 
understanding the functions of that sequence.  In theory, one 
might be able to propose mapping the connections and 
functions of all 100 billion neurons in the human brain, but 
both the science and the technology seem completely 
inadequate to address those goals, even leaving aside questions 
of whether such a map and such functions would be uniform 
across different people and their brains. 
The National Human Genome Research Institute played 
the major funding and coordinating role in the Human Genome 
Project, although with substantial contributions (and a little 
competition) from the Department of Energy. Neuroscience, 
and hence neuroethics, has no one major funding agency 
behind it.  The NIH provides a huge part of the funding for 
neuroscience, but at least three different institutes play major 
roles: the NINDS, the NIMH, and the National Institute on 
Aging (NIA).  And each is roughly the same size; for fiscal year 
2006, the President requested budgets for them of $1.5 billion, 
$1.4 billion, and $1.1 billion respectively.  The lack of a 
                                                          
 70. See COOK-DEEGAN, supra note 9, at 248. 
 71. In spite of happy press releases, the Human Genome Project did not, 
and will not, exactly achieve those goals.  First, it is hard to say what “the” 
Human Genome is.  There are about 6.4 billion human beings alive today.  
Each one has two genomes, one inherited from each parent, plus millions of 
variations caused by mutations since conception in particular lineages of cells.  
Except for identical twins, each of those two genomes is unique (and the 
millions of variations caused by post-conception mutations exist even in 
identical twins).  Even if one accepts a narrow definition of “the human 
genome” as a complete sequence of at least one copy of each of the twenty-four 
chromosomes (one through twenty-two plus the X and Y), the Human Genome 
Project still fell short.  About twenty percent of the genome, a portion called 
the “heterochromatin,” is technically quite difficult to sequence and contains 
few, if any, genes.  It is unclear when, if ever, these roughly 600 million base 
pairs will be sequenced.  See Lincoln D. Stein, Human Genome: End of the 
Beginning, 431 NATURE 915 (2004). 
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dominant institutional sponsor is another drawback for 
neuroethics. 
Even if some “big science” project were plausible, 
budgetary realities make it politically unlikely.  The short 
period of federal budget surpluses in the late 1990s has 
disappeared.  Although federal spending has increased 
substantially in the last five years, the increases have come 
largely in defense, national security, and entitlement programs, 
like Social Security and Medicare.  “Demographic realities”—
code for the aging of my baby boomer generation—mean that 
the entitlement programs will consume ever larger amounts of 
the federal budget.  On any realistic assessment, unless 
politically unpopular tax increases are adopted, huge federal 
deficits stretch into the indefinite future.  And, at a more 
specific level, after the unprecedented doubling of the NIH 
budget from 1998 to 2003, NIH appropriations are dropping in 
inflation-adjusted terms.  Multi-billion dollar brain projects are 
not currently imaginable. 
Finally, there just is not the level of public concern about 
the implications of neuroscience that drove the political 
demand for an ELSI program.  That could change.  The reasons 
for public interest and concern are substantial, but public 
knowledge about the advances of neuroscience is very limited.  
It is conceivable that early neuroethics work might lay a 
foundation for more public concern and hence could result in 
political pressure for some neuroethics funding.  On the other 
hand, to the extent that neuroethics research comes directly 
from health-related research—unlike the Human Genome 
Project—any public concerns will be undercut by the huge 
public hope for treatments and cures. 
Interestingly though, there may be another nascent federal 
bioethics program, in the ethical, legal, and social implications 
of nanotechnology, irresistibly named “nanoethics.”  
Nanotechnology does not have the kind of concrete big science 
project that ELSI had, but it has had substantial federal 
funding, amounting now to about $1 billion each year.  
According to an October 2005 article in the Chronicle of Higher 
Education,72 the National Science Foundation (NSF) awarded 
twenty-one large grants between 2000 and 2005 to research 
                                                          
 72. See Jeffrey Brainard, National Science Foundation Promotes Research 
on Impact of Nanotechnology, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 21, 2005, at A27. 
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nanotechnology.  Each of those grants was required to devote 
some attention to the social consequences of the technology, 
although those efforts were limited.  Between 1997 and 2004, 
the NSF division of social and behavioral sciences also awarded 
grants directly for nanoethics, but they totaled about $10 
million.  In October 2005, the NSF awarded four more 
nanoethics grants, the two largest of which involved $6.2 
million to Arizona State University and $5 million to the 
University of California-Santa Barbara; in each case, the funds 
are allocated over five years, so the average annual spending 
for all four grants is probably around $4 million.73 
Nanoethics is, if not big science, at least a well-funded and 
new scientific field.  It also has some public and political 
pressure, based on concerns about environmental risks (the 
gray goo,74 among others) and threats to privacy.  It will be 
interesting to see how it develops. 
Neuroethics cannot follow the funding path of ELSI, nor 
could it follow the path of nanoethics if that field succeeds in 
obtaining substantial federal funding.  Where should the field 
look for funding for conferences, books, research, fellowships, 
salary support, and the other monetarily demanding aspects of 
modern research?  (Salary support is particularly important to 
researchers with positions in medical schools, the homes of 
many bioethics centers, as their salaries are often contingent 
on grant support.) 
Some federal support should be sought.  Squeezing new 
funding from the NIH may be akin to squeezing blood from a 
turnip in its current budget situation, but the neuroscience 
funding institutes might be lobbied to set aside a small amount 
of their research funding for neuroethics.  Even 0.1% across the 
three institutes would be about $3 million each year, which 
could be allocated through a grant application process.  The 
social and behavioral sciences division of NSF may be another 
useful, if small, source. 
But neuroethics will have to look beyond the federal 
                                                          
 73. See id.  The estimate of annual spending is mine.  A recent article on 
the Bioethics Blog states, based on a slide shown at a presentation, that the 
federal government is spending $42.6 million per year on nanoethics, although 
it adds parenthetically that “I am now told that much of this is for ‘education.’”  
McGee, supra note 12.  That number seems implausibly high. 
 74. “Gray goo” is the term used to describe an apocalyptic scenario where 
uncontrollable and self-replicating nanomachines wipe out life on Earth.  The 
term, and probably the concept, originated in ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF 
CREATION (1986). 
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government, probably to foundation support.  Thus far, the 
Dana Foundation has been the major funding source for 
neuroethics research, as it has supported several major 
conferences or workshops along with several books and other 
publications.  Broader financial support needs to be sought 
from foundations, including large foundations that are not 
focused on the brain.  Foundation funding also has the 
advantage that it may be free of some explicit or implicit 
strings attached to federal funding. 
Between federal funds, foundation funds, and researchers 
who are self-funded—whose research is inexpensive and whose 
salaries are covered by so-called “hard money”—neuroethics 
may be able to survive, and even thrive, financially, but it 
seems unlikely that funding will ever come close to the levels 
provided by ELSI. 
Fortunately, it will not need to because of at least three 
ways in which neuroethics benefits from ELSI’s legacy.  First, 
ELSI has produced a cadre of legal, ethical, and social science 
researchers interested in and capable of doing research on the 
social implications of biological technologies.  ELSI’s money 
drew them into the general area and trained them as 
practitioners; neuroethics can live to a large extent off that 
inheritance.  Second, ELSI has provided the financial support 
necessary for the increased size and numbers of bioethics 
centers.  ELSI grants help pay the overhead and provide a 
critical mass of colleagues.  Centers with grants under the 
Centers of Excellence in Ethics of Research program have the 
security of several years of reliable funding, not dependent on 
individual researchers’ success in grant applications.  And 
third, ELSI has expanded the market for bioethics.  
Journalists, government officials, and even the public have 
become accustomed to the word “bioethicist.”  Books and 
articles by bioethicists and about bioethics are in greater 
demand.  And universities, think tanks, and other possible 
employers value bioethics more highly because of ELSI.  
Neuroethics will surely benefit from all of these legacies of 
ELSI. 
CONCLUSION 
“It is always hard to predict things, especially the future.”75 
                                                          
 75. This line is usually attributed to the Danish physicist Nils Bohr, but 
GREELY_FINAL_UPDATED 6/7/2006  6:34:17 PM 
2006] NEUROETHICS & ELSI 637 
 
Neuroethics is a child, or at least a stepchild, of ELSI.  As 
geneticists and neuroscientists—and all parents—know, 
children are both like and unlike their parents.  I have tried to 
predict some of the ways in which neuroethics will develop, but 
I do so with sincere humility.  I know I will be wrong in many 
of my predictions; I just don’t know which ones.  One 
prediction, though, I put forward with great confidence.  Like 
ELSI before it, neuroethics will discuss fascinating and 
important issues . . . and those people fortunate enough to be 
involved in it should have a lot of fun. 
 
                                                          
tracking it down turns out to be quite difficult.  In an earlier article, I wrote: 
I had initially thought that this was a quotation from Lawrence Peter 
("Yogi") Berra.  On examining a book of his quotations, this appears to 
be, as he would put it, "one of those things I said that I never said." 
YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK OR I REALLY DIDN'T SAY EVERYTHING I 
SAID (1998).  Data base search of news articles over the past 25 years 
reveals this quotation, or slightly variant forms of it, attributed most 
often to Berra, but also to Casey Stengel, Mark Twain, and even 
Confucius.  It is most credibly attributed to the Danish physicist, Nils 
Bohr, in several news articles quoting other physicists.  Erika Wayne, 
one of Stanford's excellent research librarians, did find the following 
version attributed to Bohr: "It is very difficult to make an accurate 
prediction, especially about the future." The quotation was used as 
one of several epigrams in GEORGE ANASTAPLO, THE AMERICAN 
MORALITY: ON LAW, ETHICS, AND GOVERNMENT viii (1992), but 
without any citation.  A concerted search has been unable to find any 
good source for the quotation, in spite of all the resources of the 
Internet. 
Henry T. Greely, Trusted Systems and Medical Records: Lowering 
Expectations, 52 STANFORD L. REV. 1585, 1591-92 n.9 (2000). 
